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Specificity and Time Horizons 
Frank Partnoy* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay argues that the short-termism debate would benefit from 
greater clarity and specificity regarding time horizons. I make four points. 
First, optimal time horizons vary in discernible ways. Second, the potential 
mismatch between actual and optimal time horizons should generate a 
range of responses. Third, investors and managers can discern and disclose 
estimates of actual and optimal time horizons (e.g., using categories such 
as preconscious, fast conscious, slow conscious, and discounting). Fourth, 
market participants, policy makers, and scholars should use such estimates 
to be more precise about time horizons. For example, critics of hedge fund 
activism could recognize that activists’ time horizons have been in the 
range of one or more years, instead of simply describing them generically 
as short-term. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay, I argue that scholars and policy makers should be more 
specific about investor time horizons. I make four points. First, investor 
time horizons vary and different types of investors have different optimal 
time horizons. Second, and accordingly, normative approaches to varying 
investor time horizons also should vary. Third, it is possible to be more 
precise about investor time horizons; I suggest several categories of 
conceptually distinct time horizons. Fourth, market participants, policy 
makers, and scholars should be more precise about time horizons; I 
suggest several ways for them to do so, including through disclosures of 
time horizon estimates. 
                                                     
* I am grateful to the participants of the Berle IX Symposium and particularly for comments from 
Jordan Barry, Robert Bartlett, Victor Fleischer, Kent Greenfield, Shaun Martin, Elizabeth Pollman, 
Eric Talley, and Anne Tucker. 
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Questions about the optimality of time horizons are challenging in 
the debate about short-termism.1 For example, some scholars and policy 
makers argue that the time horizons of firm managers should be long-term, 
in part because the relevant investor time horizons—the time horizons of 
equity capital generally—are permanent and perpetual.2 However, this 
argument typically stops short of concluding that the optimal time horizon 
of investors and firms actually should be or is infinite.3 Instead, the 
appropriate time horizon is presumptively “long-term-ish” but can vary 
based on circumstances.4 
Conversely, time horizons might not appear important in the 
corporate finance literature, where decisions by managers depend on 
discounting to facilitate the comparison of cash flows over time.5 
Approaches to firm decisions based on net present value—or internal rates 
of return versus cost of capital—purport to be indifferent to time horizons. 
Yet, these financial approaches are not agnostic about time horizons, 
particularly given the uncertainty and low present value of distant future 
cash flows.6 Moreover, in practice, managers facing capital budgeting 
                                                     
 1. For an excellent review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-
Termism and Long-Termism 12–21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 2016). 
 2. For example, consider how Vice Chancellor Travis Laster described the fiduciary obligations 
of directors in one recent opinion: “A Delaware corporation, by default, has a perpetual existence. 
Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital. In terms of the standard of conduct, therefore, the 
fiduciary relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize 
the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of providers of presumptively permanent 
equity capital, as warranted for an entity with presumptively perpetual life in which the residual 
claimants have locked in their investment.” Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 
12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *36–37 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2017). Margaret Blair has further argued 
that this concept of equity capital lock-in historically has been a central feature in the development of 
corporations. See Margaret Blair, What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 388–89 (2003). There are interesting outstanding 
questions (beyond the scope of this essay) about the extent to which equity capital lock-in matters to 
modern corporations, given the ability of corporations to provide for redemption and changes in share 
repurchases/issuance, changes in the amounts of outstanding equity capital at both public and private 
corporations, and the relatively small—though increasingly significant—percentage of investors that 
have time horizons approaching permanence or perpetuity. 
 3. For example, the directors of a firm nearing insolvency can be required to favor short-term 
liquidation over long-term continuation of the firm’s business. See Prod. Res. Grp. L.L.C. v. NCT 
Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 n.60 (Del. Ch. 2004); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe 
Commc’n Grp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 4. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(“[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests 
without regard to a fixed investment horizon.”). 
 5. See generally WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRATTON’S CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2016). 
 6. The standard practice in financial valuation is to use a terminal period beyond which the 
present value of future cash flows is discounted differently, though the techniques vary. See, e.g., DFC 
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questions use not only net present value and internal rate of return 
methodologies, but they also apply methods with specified time horizons, 
such as payback periods.7 
Although the short-termism debate often appears polarized, the 
temporal imprecision in the above arguments, and others, suggest that the 
two sides might not be so far apart in particular situations.8 A judge who 
references a view that equity capital is permanent might determine that the 
optimal approach for a particular firm is immediate dissolution or sale. A 
professor who adheres to the net present value rule might determine that 
the optimal approach for a particular firm is to favor long-term investment.  
This Essay argues that market participants, policy makers, and 
scholars all should be more specific about the length of actual and optimal 
time horizons for particular parties. It is possible to describe and disclose, 
even roughly, the variation in investor time horizons. There are bases for 
distinguishing categorically among investor types based on their actual or 
optimal time horizons. Investors and managers would benefit from greater 
specificity with respect to actual or optimal time horizons and public 
disclosures of time horizon estimates and distributions. 
The goal of this Essay is to suggest that policy makers and scholars 
address time horizons with greater particularity using broad-based 
categories and empirical findings instead of generalizations. The main 
message is to think more precisely about actual and optimal time horizons 
and to openly disclose such thinking. 
I. THE VARIATION IN OPTIMAL TIME HORIZONS 
Notions of optimality are fundamental in economics and finance. 
Historically, the development of the theory of capital mostly involved an 
optimization framework: Sir John Hicks initially formulated capital theory 
as an optimization problem for the firm.9 Kenneth J. Arrow developed this 
framework in various ways, focusing on the basic proposition that “for any 
fixed stock of capital goods there is at any moment a most profitable 
current policy.”10 In general, much of the ongoing short-termism debate 
                                                     
Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 2017 WL 3261190 (Del. Aug. 1, 2017) (describing 
several experts’ use of terminal periods and values). 
 7. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence From the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 196–201 (2001) (finding that more than half of finance 
managers use payback periods). 
 8. For example, participants at the conference appeared to agree that the holding periods of hedge 
fund activists were considerably longer than those of many other investors. 
 9. See generally JOHN R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed.1939). 
 10. KENNETH J. ARROW, INST. FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOC. SCI., TECHNICAL 
REPORT NO. 146: OPTIMAL CAPITAL POLICY WITH IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT 2 (1966). 
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can be characterized in Arrow’s language as a fundamental question about 
whether a current “myopic” decision optimally reflects future 
contingencies.11 Although the theory of capital does not explicitly model 
optimal time horizons, the concept of optimality is central to the 
underlying framework.12 
One way to conceptualize the notion of an optimal time horizon is to 
imagine a functional distribution that describes the costs and benefits 
arising from a range of time horizons. This functional distribution could 
be applied to investor time horizons or, more generally, to temporal 
decision-making. The central notion is that there is a relationship between 
a time horizon and associated costs and benefits, just as the theory of 
capital more generally has assessed marginal costs and benefits.13 
Consider Figure 1 below. 
 
Along the x-axis is the potential time horizon of a decision-maker, 
ranging from the very short term on the left to the longer term as one 
moves to the right. Figure 1 can apply to time horizons in a very general 
sense. For example, the decision-maker might be a person responding to 
                                                     
 11. See id. at 2–5 (describing the extent to which a “myopic” approach might incorporate future 
contingencies). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
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an email. With respect to a particular email, the decision-maker might 
respond instantly, or in a few minutes, or much later. Alternatively, the 
functional distribution could represent the time horizon of an investor, 
such as a hedge fund. The hedge fund might hold positions for only a few 
seconds, a few days, or a few years.14 
Along the y-axis is the expected net benefit associated with a 
particular time horizon. Note that this formulation involves an assessment 
of the net benefit ex ante; the net benefit reflects the expected benefit from 
a particular time horizon at that point rather than potential ex post net 
benefits. 
It is possible that this kind of expected net benefit specification 
would be constant (flat) regardless of time horizon. Alternatively, the 
expected net benefit associated with a particular time horizon could vary. 
The above discussion of the short-termism debate suggests that both sides 
recognize the potential for such variation: not every decision is optimally 
infinite or instantaneous. Although the functional specification of this 
variation is indeterminate, one stylized version would be a parabolic 
function like that described in Figure 1, which is concave (to the x-axis) 
with a maximum at some optimal time horizon. 
This functional specification is consistent with the notion that time 
horizon choices are a kind of optimization problem. For example, 
responding instantly to an email might generate some benefit, but taking a 
moment to consider and craft a response might generate a greater benefit; 
conversely, after waiting too long to respond to the email, any benefit 
might begin to decline and at some point approach or reach zero. Similarly, 
a hedge fund might benefit more from a holding for a shorter or longer 
period of time, depending on the circumstances. 
My claim here is not that the functional specification of net benefits 
from different time horizons follows any particular structure or shape. I 
will leave it to future scholars to develop theories about different 
specifications. Instead, I simply posit that in a particular situation there can 
be an optimal time horizon, and this optimal time horizon is likely to vary 
situationally. 
This point is not merely theoretical. Consider hedge funds, generally, 
as an example. Some hedge funds are focused primarily on algorithm-
driven strategies, and therefore would have an optimal time horizon 
                                                     
 14. Historically, the median holding periods of hedge fund activists have been in the range of 
one year. See generally Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008). 
530 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:525 
skewed to the short term, with a maximum to the left in Figure 1.15 Some 
hedge funds are focused on event-driven or market-based strategies for 
which the optimal time horizon might be several days or weeks.16 Yet 
other hedge funds, including shareholder activists, have long-term optimal 
time horizons, in the range of one year or longer.17 For such hedge funds, 
the maximum would be skewed further to the right in Figure 1. Based on 
empirical evidence, one might determine that different categories of hedge 
funds have different actual and optimal time horizons. I do not attempt to 
make that determination here; instead, my claim is simply that the optimal 
time horizon for these different categories of hedge funds is likely to vary. 
Although generalized questions of time horizons can be controversial 
in theory, the optimal time horizon for a particular firm can be relatively 
straightforward in practice. For example, at the Berle IX Symposium, I 
raised the question of what the optimal time horizon would be for a firm 
that Professor Kent Greenfield and I might establish for one purpose: To 
bet on the Boston Red Sox winning the World Series in 2017. Putting aside 
questions of legality, what would be the optimal time horizon of such a 
firm and its investors? The answer is simple: Both would have an actual 
and optimal time horizon in the range of October 2017. The precise time 
horizon depends on several unknowns related to the playoffs, but at of the 
time of the symposium, the time horizon could be specified, undisputedly, 
as roughly three months. 
It would make little sense to talk about the problems of short-termism 
for such a firm. Neither the investors nor managers of such a firm would 
focus on time horizons other than three months, unless they were trying to 
take advantage of fluctuations in the value of the bet over the interim 
before a result became known. Similarly, it would make little sense to talk 
about long-termism, permanent capital, or perpetual equity capital lock-in 
for such a firm. Professor Greenfield and I would plan simply to distribute 
any funds after the World Series (or not) and then dissolve the firm. 
Indeed, we might provide for such dissolution in advance so that our 
capital contribution would not be considered permanent in any event. To 
the extent we may worry about the long-term effects, we could do so 
separately (outside the context of this firm) but not because our time 
horizon as participants in the firm had changed. 
                                                     
15. See Robert P. Bartlett III & Justin McCrary, How Rigged Are Stock Markets?: Evidence 
from Microsecond Timestamps (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w22551, 2016) 
(describing trading by high-frequency traders as involving fractions of seconds). 
16. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43–48 (2012). 
 17.  See generally Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 14 (analyzing the benefits of 
hedge fund activities for shareholders and surveying the large-sample evidence about hedge fund ac-
tivism).  
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Alternatively, consider Tejon Ranch Corporation, the target of an 
activist campaign that Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon and I launched 
in May 2015 and pursued for nearly two years.18 Many of the most salient 
questions throughout our experience with Tejon Ranch related to optimal 
time horizons. Our optimal time horizon was roughly the same as our 
actual time horizon of about two years.19 In less time, we would not have 
had the opportunity to meet with senior management, press our proposed 
reforms, attend an annual meeting, and follow up on our proposals; the 
expected costs would have been relatively high, and the expected benefits 
would have been low. On the other hand, if we had remained invested in 
the company for a period substantially longer than two years, then the 
expected costs (including illiquidity) would have been significantly 
higher; it is unlikely that a ten- or twenty-year time horizon would have 
yielded us many additional benefits.20 
Note from the above discussion that it is unclear whether and when 
actual and optimal time horizons might coincide. One way of reframing 
the short-termism debate is to focus on the divergence between actual and 
optimal time horizons. Such a reframing might lead participants in the 
debate to be more specific about the nature of their criticisms and 
arguments, and to focus on what factors might cause a divergence between 
actual and optimal time horizons. 
The above discussion also raises a broader question: When would it 
matter that an actual time horizon differed from the optimal time horizon? 
If markets are informationally and allocatively efficient, does it make 
sense to talk about an investor’s optimal time horizon? Put another way, 
under what circumstances would an investor’s time horizon matter? If 
markets are efficient, would there be any consequence when an investor’s 
time horizon differed from the optimal time horizon of a firm? 
This broader question could also help to focus the short-termism 
debate. The argument that investor time horizons are suboptimally short-
term depends, at least in part, on the argument that short-term prices do 
not reflect certain information. For example, if various market failures or 
long-term externalities are not reflected in short-term prices, then a short-
term investor time horizon might be suboptimal.21 
                                                     
 18. See Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Frank and Steven’s Excellent Corporate-
Raiding Adventure, ATLANTIC (May 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/ 
05/frank-and-stevens-excellent-corporate-raiding-adventure/521436/ [https://perma.cc/VZ8Q-
VH8V]. 
19. See id. 
 20. Other investors in Tejon Ranch arguably had both longer and shorter optimal time horizons 
than ours. Several large shareholders told us their time horizon was measured generationally, or at 
least in decades. Yet, the volume of daily Tejon Ranch share trading was substantial, suggesting that 
many investors had shorter time horizons than two years. See id. 
21. See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 16, at 233–46. 
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Again, my point is that it is difficult to conclude that investor or 
manager time horizons are too short-term or too long-term without some 
idea of what the optimal time horizons might be. More fundamentally, 
such optimal time horizons are unlikely to be fixed or infinite. They are 
likely to vary, and any variation in optimality arguably should be a part of 
the policy discussion about investor time horizons. 
II. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO VARYING TIME HORIZONS 
If one accepts the proposition that optimal investor time horizons 
vary, the next question is a normative one. What are the possible 
approaches to varying optimality in investor time horizons? 
First, one approach would be to attempt matching the time horizon 
of a firm’s managers to the optimal time horizon of the firm’s investors in 
a way that is similar to duration matching for asset–liability purposes.22 Of 
course, the viability of such an “optimal time horizon matching” approach 
would depend on being able to articulate a meaningful measure of 
optimality among a firm’s investors. Such a measure would be easier to 
assess for small firms with a handful of investors or for larger firms with 
substantially homogeneous investor categories. 
Much of the short-termism debate is arguably related to this idea of 
matching investor and manager time horizons. For example, the argument 
that the optimal time horizon of investors should be long-term, measured 
in decades, whereas the actual time horizon of firm managers is much 
shorter-term, measured in months, is really an argument that time horizon 
mismatch is normatively undesirable. 
Second, an alternative approach would be to attempt to match the 
time horizon of a firm’s managers to the actual time horizon of the firm’s 
investors (as opposed to the optimal investor time horizon). This “actual 
time horizon matching” approach would depend on being able to articulate 
a meaningful measure of actual investor time horizons.23 However, there 
is evidence that some such measures would be reasonably straightforward 
                                                     
 22. Insurance companies and pension funds often seek to match their liabilities with assets that 
will generate sufficient cash flows to cover those liabilities at the appropriate times and in the requisite 
amounts. See, e.g., Zvi Bodie, On Asset-Liability Matching and Federal Deposit and Pension 
Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 323 (2006) (assessing the risks of asset-liability 
mismatches). One interesting question for proponents of the equity capital lock-in argument is whether 
equity investments—as presumably the longest-term investment assets—are an appropriate match for 
long-dated fixed liabilities. 
23. For example, Anne Tucker has investigated the actual investor time horizons of mutual 
funds. See Anne Tucker, The Long and Short of Portfolio Turnover Ratios and Mutual Fund 
Investment Time Horizons (2017) (working paper) (on file with Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law Journal 
of Corp. Law). 
2018] Specificity and Time Horizons 533 
to calculate.24 As with an optimal matching approach, reliance on an actual 
matching approach would be easier to assess for small firms or for larger 
firms with a more homogeneous investor base. Although one could 
calculate the mean or median actual investor holding periods, it is unclear 
the extent to which one should take into account the distribution of actual 
holding periods. Should the approach change for firms with an investor 
base that has a wider (or narrower) standard deviation of actual investor 
holding periods? 
Another difficulty is that actual and optimal investor time horizons 
can change over time. How should the approach change as demographics, 
investor preferences, or technology change? For example, imagine a firm 
that has college-age investors today. Should that firm’s approach to 
temporal decision-making change as these investors age? What if the age 
distribution of investors remains constant but the generational preferences 
change over time (as is likely if, for example, millennial investors care 
more about the longer term)? What if technology leads investors with 
shorter attention spans to adopt shorter time horizons? 
Third, another alternative would be for firm managers to consider 
some time horizon other than actual or optimal investor time horizons, 
including a time horizon that matched the timing of potential externalities 
or the time horizon of non-shareholder stakeholders. Advocates of such 
positions might conclude that firm managers should have a long-term time 
horizon of, say, 100 years. If so, the debate about short-termism would 
benefit from a clear articulation of what that time period might be, along 
with bases for a conclusion that it is optimal. 
Finally, one might decide to reject all of the above arguments and 
conclude instead that firm managers should not make decisions based on, 
or even consider, time horizons at all. Who might advocate such a 
position? Advocates of market efficiency would conclude that time 
horizons do not matter much, or alternatively, that the costs of a policy 
focusing on particular time horizons might be greater than the benefits. 
Instead, managers should simply follow the net present value rule and take 
on projects whose net discounted present value is positive; according to 
this approach, any questions about time horizons are implicitly resolved 
when managers calculate their cost of capital and discount future cash 
                                                     
 24. Several of the participants in the Berle IX conference have undertaken efforts to specify 
investor time horizons for different categories of investors. See id. (assessing empirical research on 
mutual fund investor time horizons); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387 (2018) (assessing a range of 
empirical approaches to investor time horizons). Moreover, data regarding certain categories of 
investors’ time horizons is available from Form 13-F filings and from commercially available 
databases. 
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flows.25 Likewise, even if markets are not efficient, it might be too costly 
to implement policies focused on particular time horizons. As noted above, 
in practice, finance professionals often consider time horizons explicitly 
in their capital budgeting decisions, finance theory notwithstanding. Are 
such managers inappropriately short-sighted? 
The above discussion demonstrates that the relative benefits and 
costs of the various approaches depend on the difficulty of articulating a 
precise actual or optimal time horizon. If it were costly to determine 
investor time horizons, then a policy that focuses on a precise temporal 
measure would be dubious. On the other hand, to the extent it is relatively 
straightforward to articulate an actual or optimal investor time horizon, a 
policy of ignoring investor time horizons is at least as dubious. The central 
question thus becomes whether it is possible to articulate the variation in 
actual and optimal investor time horizons in a meaningful and useful way. 
III. CATEGORIES OF TIME HORIZON VARIATION 
Next, I suggest some categories of investor time horizons. Although 
Figure 1 suggests that optimal time horizons are continuous, with small 
variations in net benefits for particular changes in time horizons, it 
arguably would be very costly to discern very small variations in actual or 
optimal time horizons with great specificity. However, it is relatively 
straightforward to distinguish categorically among clusters of investor 
time horizon variation. Put simply, time horizons can be put into buckets 
based on the length of time. 
In previous research, I described ways in which temporal clusters can 
be useful in assessing a range of decisions.26 I will not recite the details of 
that research here, but I will simply note that these temporal clusters are 
distinguished by significant and substantive differences in the 
physiological and financial aspects of decision-making that arise during 
different periods of time. Specifically, for purposes of categorizing 
investor time horizons, one might separate the x-axis of Figure 1 into four 
categories, which I will label: Preconscious, Fast-conscious, Slow-
conscious, and Discounting. 
                                                     
 25.  As noted above, the key question would be about net present value (NPV) based on assump-
tions regarding discount rates and timing, but the time horizon itself would not be determinative. It is 
worth noting, that many executives reject the NPV approach to the extent it has deleterious timing 
consequences. See generally John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Finan-
cial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2005) (finding that executives abandon the NPV rule when it 
would have negative quarterly earnings implications). 
 26. See generally PARTNOY, supra note 16.  
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Preconscious. Preconscious time horizons are generally in the range 
of 500 milliseconds or less.27 The neuroscientist Benjamin Libet 
demonstrated that human beings are not capable of consciously reacting 
in less than half a second.28 Most algorithmic and computer-driven or 
automated trading strategies are designed to execute and respond in 
milliseconds or even microseconds. 
In the preconscious category, policy questions relate not to investor 
psychology but to market design. For example, might auctions more 
efficiently and fairly allocate the information gains to superfast trading? 
Should high-frequency traders be required to post intraday margin 
requirements? These are important questions but are not generally related 
to corporate governance. 
From the perspective of investor time horizons, preconscious 
investors are categorically different. Indeed, they are arguably not 
“investors” at all. Share purchasers who trade in and out of stocks intra-
day do not exercise the voting or litigation rights associated with share 
ownership.29 To the extent algorithmic traders do not hold shares for more 
than a day, they typically are not even considered to be shareholders for 
corporate governance purposes.30 
Fast-conscious. The fast-conscious category refers to time horizons 
ranging from half a second up to a few minutes.31 During this time horizon 
category, human beings are capable of conscious reaction, but they also 
tend to make certain kinds of behavioral mistakes. Although there is no 
strong biological basis for the distinction some psychologists make 
between System 1 and System 2, one might think of the fast-conscious 
categories as belonging within System 1.32 
In the fast-conscious category, investor protection themes become 
more important. From the perspective of investor time horizons, the fast-
conscious category is a source of concern for some scholars and policy 
makers who worry about short-term focus. Are shareholders who buy and 
sell within a period of seconds and minutes less likely to incorporate a 
firm’s long-term perspective? Under what circumstances will market 
prices adjust within the fast-conscious time horizon to reflect new long-
                                                     
 27. See id. ch. 1–4. 
 28. See id. at 28–31. 
29. See generally Bartlett & McCrary, supra note 15 (analyzing trading positions that are 
purchased and sold intra-day). 
 30. For example, such purchasers and sellers of shares would not be counted as record date 
holders entitled to vote. 
 31. See PARTNOY, supra note 16, ch. 5–8. 
 32. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012) (arguing for a 
distinction between the faster, more automatic System 1 and the slower, more analytic System 2). 
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term information? Unlike the preconscious category, the fast-conscious 
category is a rich source of many of the fundamental questions in law and 
finance. 
Slow-conscious. The slow-conscious category refers to time horizons 
of hours, days, weeks, and months.33 This temporal category roughly 
corresponds to what some psychologists call System 2.34 This is a more 
contemplative time horizon, though, it is not without behavioral effects. 
Slow-conscious decisions are prone to be based on “clock time,” as 
opposed to “event time,” so time periods can be used as measuring sticks 
in ways that are potentially suboptimal.35 
In the slow-conscious category, questions about the quarterly and 
annual focus of the securities disclosure regime and compensation metrics 
used to measure executive performance become more relevant. Is the 
slow-conscious time horizon slow enough to incorporate the concerns 
suggested by those who argue that firms should be managed with the 
permanence of equity capital in mind? 
Discounting. Finally, discounting refers to longer-term time 
horizons, also within the category some psychologists call System 2, but 
with a sufficiently long-term horizon of years and decades so that discount 
rates start to more significantly impact decisions.36 For example, if an 
investor has a time horizon of decades, the discount rate becomes one of 
the most important, if not the dominating, determinants of value and 
return. 
The discounting category encompasses the truly long term. From an 
investor time horizon perspective, the difficult questions about 
discounting are the extent to which long-term costs and benefits can be 
accurately measured, and also what discount rate is appropriate. To what 
extent should firms, or their regulators, apply lower social discount rates 
to long-term cash flows, as opposed to firm- or project-related cost of 
capital rates? Much of the short-termism debate is about externalities: how 
should the timing externalities be measured, and how should they be 
discounted?37 
The lines between these four categories can be blurry but 
nevertheless help to divide time horizons roughly. If investors or managers 
                                                     
 33. See PARTNOY, supra note 16, ch. 9–12. 
 34.  See Jim Holt, Two Brains Running, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/11/27/books/review/thinking-fast-and-slow-by-daniel-kahneman-book-review.html 
(reviewing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012)). 
 35. For a description of clock time vs. event time see PARTNOY, supra note 16, at 197–208. 
 36. See id. ch. 13–14. 
 37. I considered some of these questions, with a particular focus on firm decisions that impact 
human life, for Berle VIII. See Frank Partnoy, Corporations and Human Life, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
399 (2017). 
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are skeptical about being precise in describing time horizons, they could 
begin by using the above categories. For example, trade organizations 
might group their institutional investor members based on their time 
horizon categories. Likewise, a board of directors might ask its proxy 
advisory or solicitation firms to divide the firm’s investor base into the 
above four categories, with approximate percentages for each. 
These four rough categories also should be useful to policy makers 
and therefore are relevant to my final topic here: how might policy makers 
use investor time horizons more precisely? I now turn to the potential 
policy responses to varying time horizons.  
IV. TIME HORIZON-RELATED POLICY RESPONSES 
Policy makers already take into account differences among the above 
four categories in various contexts, albeit not explicitly or precisely. For 
example, consider judicial doctrine. The business judgment rule and gen-
eral judicial deference to business decisions can be thought of as jurispru-
dentially based on a relatively long-term slow conscious (or discount rate) 
temporal category. One reason for judges to presume business decisions 
are proper is that it is helpful for directors and officers to be able to make 
long-term plans without the scrutiny of litigation and adjudication, partic-
ularly if investors are too focused on short-term results. If policy makers 
believe that the appropriate temporal category for most business decisions 
is relatively long-term, the business judgment rule is an appropriate tool 
for implementing and supporting that belief. 
Alternatively, if policy makers prefer to match managerial and 
investor time horizons, they might determine that a shorter time horizon is 
preferable. When it is likely that a company will be sold, or perhaps will 
become bankrupt, the optimal time horizon is arguably shorter. 
Accordingly, the business judgment rule might no longer be an appropriate 
jurisprudential mechanism in such circumstances, and instead, judges 
might consider implementing a policy based on a shorter-term time 
horizon, perhaps in the fast-conscious range. 
Both the Revlon doctrine38 and the zone of insolvency cases 
discussed earlier represent such a shorter temporal approach. If the sale or 
insolvency of a company is nearly inevitable, the rationale for deference 
to a longer-term time horizon becomes weaker. Courts view arguments 
from directors and officers more skeptically when it has become inevitable 
that a company will be sold.39 Instead, the role of the managers become 
                                                     
 38. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(requiring that board fiduciary duties in the context of a sale of the company be focused on the short-
term interests of shareholders and applying enhanced scrutiny to board decision in this context). 
39. See id.  
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shorter term: something closer to maximizing the sale price of the 
company and thus deferring longer term questions to the buyer. Likewise, 
courts focus on short-term transactions when a company is near 
bankruptcy. Judges become more skeptical of arguments that a particular 
long-term strategy is optimal under such short-term temporal pressures. 
These jurisprudential approaches collectively vary based on investor 
time horizons. If the investor time horizon is very long-term, the business 
judgment rule is appropriate. If the investor time horizon is significantly 
shorter-term, enhanced judicial scrutiny might be more appropriate.  
More generally, judges might decide explicitly when a time horizon 
is too short for purposes of corporate law and corporate governance. The 
intra-day ownership of high-frequency traders and their lack of 
involvement in corporate governance suggests that they should not be 
counted as investors in any meaningful sense. Moreover, the costs 
associated with determining the volume of algorithmic trading during 
specific intra-day time horizons are significant. But what about a 
shareholder who buys one millisecond before the record date cutoff and 
then sells immediately thereafter? 
Beyond the judicial context, policy makers already have adopted 
rules that target behavioral effects in both the fast conscious and slow 
conscious categories. Suitability and margin requirements, as well as 
fiduciary rules, arguably are designed to protect some categories of 
investors in relatively short-term time horizons. Should policy makers be 
more explicit about time horizons in these circumstances? Might private 
ordering solutions be deemed more reasonable when the investor time 
horizons are longer-term but scrutinized when there is short-term time 
pressure? Consider for example the “cooling off” periods for purchases of 
some products, including cars. 
With respect to the longest-term discount rate time horizon, there has 
been an extensive debate about the potential costs to future generations. 
Scholars have been particularly focused on questions related to social 
discount rates. Such focus is warranted because if a firm’s cost of capital 
is used, then even very substantial long-term externalities, including 
degradation of the planet, have small present value costs. What if, instead 
of focusing on discount rates, policy makers were more explicit about time 
horizons in assessing costs? Should there be a difference between costs 
that will be incurred in one generation versus one century versus one 
millennium? 
Finally, there are important policy questions related to the disclosure 
of time horizons, either in the four categorical clusters described above or 
perhaps more precisely. Should managers discuss or disclose their views 
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of investor time horizons? When might disclosure of time horizons be 
beneficial? 
For example, investors could publish their actual holding periods, 
along with a statement about their optimal time horizons. Firms could 
study the holding periods of their investors and then publish their findings. 
It would be useful for other investors and policy makers—as well as firm 
managers—to have an estimate of not only mean and median investor time 
horizons but also statistical distributions. One might compare the average 
holding period of time horizons of a firm’s investors with those of other 
firms, including peers, to determine if the company’s investor base is 
relatively short-term or long-term. Firm officers could assess whether the 
time horizons of their projects, or perhaps their own subjective time 
horizons, are shorter or longer than those of their investors. Firm directors 
could discuss explicitly what they determine to be a firm’s optimal time 
horizon and even state a temporal range publicly. 
As noted above, these market participants probably already have a 
rough idea of a firm’s investor time horizons, as well as some notion of 
what their managers’ time horizons should be. They already know whether 
a significant portion of a firm’s shares are held by index funds or other 
long-term investors. They likely know the extent to which shares are held 
by hedge fund activists or mutual funds, which might have somewhat 
shorter-term time horizons. Advisory services provide information about 
the distribution of investors among individuals and institutions. All of this 
information is now available in a limited fashion. 
However, what is not available, or published, is a weighted average 
or range that describes the time horizons of a firm’s investors as of a 
particular point in time. Such a number or range could be published on a 
quarterly basis, or perhaps more frequently, to enable the tracking of 
changes. Likewise, the statistical distribution of investor time horizons 
could be published, either in terms of percentiles or standard deviations. 
A weighted average would give judges, scholars, and policy makers 
a more precise measure of the time horizons of a particular firm’s 
investors. Instead of simply suggesting that one group of investors has a 
long-term perspective, or that a different group is overly short-term, the 
weighted average would give an overall view of the firm’s investors’ time 
horizons. 
Alternatively, investors also could publish their own time horizons, 
both actual time horizons based on their holding periods and optimal 
horizons based on the subjective beliefs of their senior employees. These 
numbers also could be useful. Indeed, corporate managers might rely on 
these time horizons instead of attempting to calculate time horizons on 
their own. 
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In addition, both the constituents of institutional investors and their 
regulators would benefit from knowing explicitly such estimates of actual 
and optimal time horizons. For example, pensioners with a time horizon 
of many years or decades would benefit from knowing whether their 
pension fund has a substantially shorter-time horizon. Publishing time 
horizon data could pressure managers of institutional investors to 
implement trading strategies that would result in a convergence between 
their time horizons and the time horizons of their constituents. 
The business media and investors generally, also arguably, would 
benefit from the publication of this information. The data could be used in 
place of, or to confront or interrogate, assertions about investor time 
horizons. One could refer explicitly to such published time horizons in 
place of more generalized notions of short-term versus long-term. 
On the other hand, perhaps there is not much of an appetite for such 
data as compared to more generalized assertions. For example, data about 
activist shareholder holding periods showing that activists have relatively 
long holding periods (of a year or more) has been available for more than 
a decade, yet many academics and policy makers nevertheless assert that 
such activists are short-term in nature. The appetite to use and consume it 
might limit the utility of any additional information. 
Such measures also would generate some empirical challenges. For 
example, how should one weight the presence of high-frequency traders 
that hold shares only intra-day and clear out their positions as of the close 
of trading? Arguably, those investors should not be included given the 
complexity of calculating their intra-day holding periods and their status 
as very short-term shareholders. But it would be difficult and costly to 
tabulate their intra-day positions. 
The question of when time horizons should be disclosed could be 
determined case by case, based on an analysis of costs and benefits. My 
modest argument here is that the optimal amount of disclosure of specific 
time horizons is not likely to be zero. More generally, my argument is that 
policy makers should be more specific than simply asserting “short-term” 
or “long-term.” 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars and policy makers should be more explicit about investor 
time horizons. Investors, managers, and regulators should be more precise 
and explicit about actual and optimal time horizons. And the debate about 
“short-term” versus “long-term” should evolve into a debate about more 
narrowly circumscribed temporal categories. 
I have suggested some ways of thinking about how market 
participants and regulators might be more precise about investor time 
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horizons. Institutional investors could describe their actual time horizons 
by publishing their holding periods over time. Firms could publish the 
distributions of their investors’ time horizons, including periodic averages 
and standard deviations along with a statement about their own optimal 
time horizons. Regulators could differentiate among entities based on their 
time horizons. Many policy makers, including judges, already make such 
distinctions, at least implicitly.40 
Perhaps most importantly, scholars could be more specific about 
what they mean when they discuss the normative implications of short-
termism. At minimum, critics of hedge fund activists could recognize that 
activists’ time horizons are in the range of one year or more, instead of 
simply describing them generically as short-term. The debate about short-
termism would benefit from greater specificity about time horizons. 
 
                                                     
 40. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, No. 565, 2016, 2017 WL 
6375829 (Del. Dec. 14, 2017) (referencing terminal periods in assessing valuation analysis). 
